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THE WARREN COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION (WITH SPECIAL
EMPHASIS ON BROWN AND LOVING)
Akhil Reed Amar*WHEN Earl Warren joined the Court as its fourteenth Chief Jus-
tice in 1953, Jim Crow ruled the South. Many states dis-
franchised blacks with impunity. The Bill of Rights did not
generally apply against the states. The Court had never used the First
Amendment to invalidate congressional action. Some states had suc-
ceeded in chilling core political expression. State-organized prayers were
commonplace in public-school classrooms. State criminal defendants had
precious few federal constitutional rights. No general right to vote ex-
isted. Almost all state legislatures were malapportioned, some grossly so.
Over the next sixteen years, Warren helped change all that, dismantling
the old judicial order and laying the foundations of the basic doctrinal
regime that has remained in place ever since. Warren did not act alone, of
course. But it is conventional to periodize the Supreme Court by refer-
ence to its chief justices, and the "Warren Court" is an especially handy
label, denoting a remarkable period of judicial history, beginning with the
Court's deliberations and decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and
culminating in a series of landmark rulings in the 1960s, dramatically ex-
tending the reach of the Bill of Rights and revolutionizing the right to
vote.
A powerful triumvirate led the Court in this pivotal era: Earl Warren-
a former Republican governor and vice presidential candidate from the
West; Hugo Black, a former Democratic senator from the South who had
been on the Court since the late 1930s; and William Brennan, a former
Democratic state court judge from the Northeast who joined the Court in
1956. In addition to their striking geographic, professional, and political
complementarities, the Warren-Black-Brennan triumvirate brought im-
pressive methodological diversity to the bench. The Chief inclined toward
arguments from constitutional ethos and American ideals of fair play;
Black liked to highlight the literal words of the Constitution and their
original intent; and Brennan generally saw things through the lenses of
* Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This essay derives,
virtually verbatim, from the Irving L. Goldberg Lecture delivered at SMU Law School on
March 18, 2014, borrowing from material first presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of my 2012




case law and practicality.'
Decades after Warren's departure, his Court continues to inspire spir-
ited debate, but most commentators have missed the real virtues, vices,
and implications of the Warren Court revolution. Many conservative crit-
ics have accused Warren and his brethren of turning the Constitution up-
side down-dishonoring the document's text and original intent,
disrespecting the considered views of coordinate branches of government,
and disregarding American public opinion. In response, many of the
Court's liberal admirers have glibly conceded the truth of these objec-
tions but countered that constitutional text, original understandings, con-
gressional legislation, and popular sentiments are vastly overrated as
decisional guideposts. According to these friends of the Court, the War-
ren-era justices were wiser and more evenhanded than the outdated con-
stitutional text, the self-serving politicos in Congress, and the unwashed
majority of ordinary Americans. Thus, the high court brethren were right
to follow their own lights.
With defenders like this, who needs detractors? Even if the Warren
Court justices were indeed smarter and fairer than everyone else-a
doubtful proposition-these men in robes swore oaths to uphold the
Constitution, and their opinions purported to apply, not amend, that doc-
ument. Let us, then, review the work of the Warren Court and measure it
against the words of the written Constitution.
In this Irving L. Goldberg Lecture-a lecture named in honor of one of
the great judicial crusaders for racial justice in the late twentieth cen-
tury-I shall pay special attention to the Warren Court's most famous
encounters with Jim Crow. Those seeking more detailed discussion of
other major quadrants of Warren Court case law may wish to consult my
most recent book, America's Unwritten Constitution, which seeks to place
the claims that I shall make today in a broader and more comprehensive
framework of analysis.
I. BROWN
Perhaps the most iconic moment in twentieth-century American judi-
cial history occurred on May 17, 1954, when the Court held that racial
segregation in public schools was per se unconstitutional. Brown v. Board
of Education famously ruled against state and local regimes of race sepa-
ration,2 while Brown's companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, proclaimed
that the same anti-segregation principles applied to the federal govern-
ment.3 In a widening circle of later rulings that made clear that the jus-
tices were completely repudiating the "separate but equal" doctrine
underlying the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Warren Court held
that apartheid had to end not just in public schools but in virtually every
1. For more on these distinct styles of constitutional argument, see generally PHILIP
BOBBI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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domain where Jim Crow laws had prevented whites and blacks from in-
termingling-at state beaches, on public golf courses, inside buses, and
even within the bonds of matrimony.4
These rulings had deep constitutional roots. Jim Crow aimed to create
two hereditary classes of Americans, with whites on top and blacks on the
bottom. This racial class system was a throwback to aristocracy, assigning
Americans unequal and intergenerationally entrenched legal slots on the
basis of birth status. Such a regime was hard to square with the demo-
cratic social structure expressed and implied by the Philadelphia Consti-
tution. Beyond the Preamble and the Article IV Republican-Government
Clause, the bans on federal and state titles of nobility in Article I explic-
itly condemned the trappings of aristocracy: "No title of nobility shall be
granted by the United States" and "No state shall . . . . grant any title of
nobility." Under the letter and spirit of these clauses, which promised a
democratic republic and renounced a feudalism based on birth and blood,
no American government could properly name some Americans "lords"
and others "commoners." But in effect that was precisely what Jim Crow
circa 1954 aimed to do, perpetuating a hereditary overclass of fair-
skinned lords atop a hereditary underclass of dark-skinned commoners.
Alongside the anti-nobility clauses, another pair of Article I provisions
prohibited both the state and federal governments from enacting "Bill[s]
of Attainder"-statutes that singled out persons by name and pro-
nounced them guilty of capital offenses. Beneath this specific rule ran a
deeper and wider principle that forbade government from stigmatizing
persons because of who they were (their status) as opposed to what they
did (their conduct). When read generously, with idealistic attention to
both letter and spirit, the original Constitution thus seemed to condemn a
legalized racial hierarchy.5
However, this idealistic reading did not prevail in the early republic.
Arrayed against this grand vision were antebellum arguments that on ra-
cial-equality issues, the Constitution had to be understood as a compro-
mising and compromised document. Strong constitutional protections of
chattel slavery were tightly woven into both the fabric of the document-
most enduringly in the three-fifths clause, giving slaveholders extra politi-
cal clout in both Congress and the electoral college-and the fabric of
everyday life in antebellum America. In the old South there was in fact a
legal structure of lordship and serfdom despite the anti-nobility clauses.
Nor were these clauses unique in not meaning what they seemed to say.
Slavery contradicted a huge part of the original Constitution, if the words
of that document were read idealistically. For example, despite the Bill of
4. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Bolling, 347 U.S. 497; Mayor & City Council of
Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (discussing beaches); Holmes v.
City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (discussing golf courses); Gayle v. Brow-
der, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (discussing buses); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (discussing matrimony).
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 203, 215-16 (1996).
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Rights, slaves had no entitlements to worship, assemble, speak, bear
weapons, or marry-indeed, no right even to eat and sleep as they
pleased. In effect, each slave was sentenced to life imprisonment at birth
without any ordinary due process in the form of an individualized adjudi-
cation of wrongdoing.6
Candid antebellum interpreters resolved the original Constitution's
seeming contradictions by conceding that slaves were simply not part of
"We the People" at the founding. Rather, slaves were akin to enemy
aliens, and America's Constitution aimed to protect Americans first and
foremost. If protections for the American people meant privations for
other peoples-whether the British, the Spanish, the French, the
Mohawks, or the slaves-then so be it.
Free blacks, however, were a different story. Many had borne arms for
America in the Revolution and had even voted on the Constitution itself.
Thus, free blacks in antebellum America could plausibly claim all the
Constitution's guarantees-or, more modestly, could claim these guaran-
tees in any state that recognized their formal citizenship. Alas, the ante-
bellum Supreme Court saw things differently. Chief Justice Taney's 1857
opinion in Dred Scott went so far as to proclaim that a free black de-
scended from slaves could never be a citizen even if his home state said
otherwise. Taney's was a twisted and ultimately temporary reading of the
document. In the wake of the Civil War, America adopted a trio of
amendments reaffirming the most idealistic elements of the Philadelphia
Constitution and renouncing the original text's original sin.
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and empowered Con-
gress to pass sweeping anti-caste legislation, a mission Congress immedi-
ately began to fulfill. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments made
clear that the republic was being re-founded on principles of free and
equal citizenship. Pointedly repudiating Taney, the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment declared the birthright citizenship of all persons
born in America, black and white alike: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the state wherein they reside." Notably, this
clause governed the federal government as well as the states. In the next
sentence, the word "equal" explicitly appeared, promising that all persons
would receive "equal protection of the laws." Finally, the Fifteenth
Amendment threw voting booths open, inviting blacks to participate
equally with whites in the grand project of American democracy. With
this trio of amendments proclaiming a new birth of freedom, the key con-
tradictions and compromises of the Founders' Constitution melted away.
No longer was it necessary or proper to read the Preamble and the other
anti-aristocracy and anti-attainder clauses in a stingy way.
In light of all these constitutional clauses, all these structural considera-
tions, and all this historical evidence, Brown and Bolling were not just
6. On "extra" clout for slave holders, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONS-m
TUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 87-98, 148-59, 344-47 (2005) [hereinafter ACAB].
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correct but clearly correct. These iconic cases vindicated the central
meaning of the Reconstruction amendments. Jim Crow laws were not
truly equal. American apartheid created a subordinated caste in violation
of the vision of the Thirteenth Amendment and its early implementing
legislation; perpetuated two unequal classes of citizens in defiance of the
logic of the Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence; deprived blacks of
the genuinely equal laws commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment's
next sentence (and by the companion Fifth Amendment); and kept blacks
and whites apart in a manner that renounced the premise and promise of
the Fifteenth Amendment that Americans of different races would come
together-at polling places, in legislatures, on juries-as democratic
equals.7
II. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Leading critics (and some friends) of the Warren Court have raised two
counterarguments based on the alleged original intent of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments. First, while the Fourteenth Amendment was pending,
many congressional supporters emphatically stated that it would not pro-
hibit segregation. Second, although the Reconstruction Congress never
explicitly enacted legal segregation, it did continue to fund the preexisting
segregated schools in the nation's capital, and it even allowed its own
public galleries in the Capitol building to be racially segregated.
Practices put in place as the ink on a newly ratified constitutional
clause is still drying may properly help resolve textual ambiguities. But
post-enactment practices cannot trump the central meaning of a constitu-
tional provision as that provision was plainly understood by the public at
the moment of its enactment. When the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, Americans undeniably understood that one of its central pur-
poses was to end all "Black Codes"-laws that withheld from blacks the
ordinary civil rights enjoyed by whites. Virtually all the amendment's sup-
porters agreed that it would prohibit any law that enforced white
supremacy in the domain of civil rights.
For example, had any legislature in 1869 enacted a candid statute enti-
tled "An Act to Put Blacks in Their Proper Place at the Bottom of Soci-
7. Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment promised "due process of law"-
the Fifth vis-A-vis the feds and the Fourteenth vis-A-vis states. As understood by the Recon-
struction generation, who in effect reglossed the Fifth Amendment by adopting a later
amendment echoing it, "law" in its nature was general, equal, and impartial; and the "due
process" that generated "law" had to respect that nature by ensuring that lawmaking
would be general and prospective, while law execution/adjudication would be impartial.
Thus, implicit in due process, as understood by the Reconstruction generation, was an
equality idea of sorts. Indeed, an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment spoke of
"equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st
Sess., 1034 (1866). The final draft, which featured separate "equal protection" and "due
process" clauses, aimed not to sharply contradistinguish these two related concepts but to
elaborate their interrelatedness as two sides of the same coin: Proper "law" had to be equal
and pursuant to fair process. To punish or stigmatize a person on the basis of his birth
status violated this vision, which the Reconstruction Congress understood as a first-princi-
ples limit that derived from the nature of law and thus bound all levels of government.
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ety," or "An Act to Demean and Degrade Negroes," or "An Act to Deny
the Equal Citizenship and Civil Equality of NonWhites," such a statute
would have plainly violated the core meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as understood by those who framed and ratified it in 1866-68. The
only question in 1954 was whether Jim Crow was legally equivalent to
these hypothesized laws-equivalent in purpose, equivalent in effect, and
equivalent in social meaning. True, Jim Crow laws, with a sly wink, pur-
ported to be "equal" and did not declare their true social meaning with
the candor of our hypothetical statutes. But by 1954, honest observers
understood that the "equal" part of "separate but equal" was a sham. The
whole point of Jim Crow was inequality, and everyone knew it.8
How, then, are we to account for the fact that the Reconstruction Con-
gress itself failed to end segregation and instead ended up perpetuating
segregation in certain respects?
Actually, many Fourteenth Amendment supporters opposed racial seg-
regation. One of the amendment's chief architects, House leader Thad-
deus Stevens, established an interracial orphanage upon his death and
chose to be buried alongside African Americans in an integrated grave-
yard. He composed his own tombstone inscription:
I repose in this quiet and secluded spot
Not from any natural preference for solitude
But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race
by Charter Rules,
I have chosen this that I might illustrate
in my death
The Principles which I advocated
Through a long life
III. EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR
Stevens went to his final resting place in August 1868, less than a month
after the Fourteenth Amendment became the supreme law of the land.9
While Stevens ranked among the most radical of Republicans on racial
issues, many other Republicans were also high-minded opponents of le-
gally imposed segregation. But some Republicans were considerably less
zealous, and most Democrats refused to support an all-out crusade
against segregation. In the end, faithful constitutional interpreters must
investigate not merely how many segregationists existed from 1866-68,
but also what they said and did, and whether their words and deeds plau-
sibly glossed the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, we must probe how
the unwritten Constitution of the mid-1860s interacted with the written
Constitution itself. The question is not just whether Representative X or
8. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
9. HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGALITARIAN
xi (1997).
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Senator Y supported segregation in 1867 or 1869, but how he read the
Constitution's words-how he reconciled segregationism with the Consti-
tution's express commands.
Ultimately, nothing in what segregationists actually said or did pro-
vides good grounds for revising our initial understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment's central meaning. The text calls for equal protection
and equal citizenship, period. There is no textual exception for segrega-
tion, no clause that says "segregation is permissible even if unequal." Nor
did most 1860s segregationists who supported the amendment argue that
there was such a categorical exception. Instead, they offered up a medley
of legal and factual assertions, some plausible and others less so. 10
Many merely argued that separation was not intrinsically unequal and
therefore unconstitutional. As a matter of logic they were right. It is logi-
cally possible to imagine forms of separation that are not unequal. For
example, separate bathrooms for men and women today are not widely
understood, by either men or women, as stigmatizing or subordinating.
But in some places and at some times, separate bathrooms might indeed
be a way of keeping women down. In Jim Crow America, racially sepa-
rate train cars, bus seats, schools, bathrooms, drinking fountains, and the
like were engines of inequality in purpose, effect, and social meaning.
They were ways of keeping blacks down, creating a pervasive legal system
of untouchability and uncleanness that violated the basic equality ideal
constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Put differently, this first segregationist argument accepted the correct
legal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and simply posited that as a
matter of fact-not law-separate could and would be equal in the Capi-
tol galleries and elsewhere. Whether or not this fact was true in 1868, it
hardly answered the question in 1896 or 1954. Surely the Court was enti-
tled to draw its own factual conclusions about whether separate was actu-
ally equal. Although the Brown Court overstated when it proclaimed that
in the field of education separate was inherently unequal, the Court surely
could properly say, with the benefit of history, that Jim Crow in America
was inevitably unequal. Brown came at the end of a decades-long string of
cases in which black plaintiffs challenging regimes that claimed to be
"separate but equal" had been obliged to bear the expense of proving
actual inequality case by case-a string of cases in which inequality was
10. While each of the main segregationist arguments persuaded some Republicans in
the 1860s, none appears to have won over a majority of Republicans at that time. In em-
bracing or accepting segregation, various Republican Congressmen in the 1860s did not
need to agree upon one single plausible legal theory. Various minority theories, even if
each was ultimately implausible, could nevertheless give rise to a powerful political bloc-a
bloc reinforced by diehard Democrats who stood united in their opposition to the Four-
teenth Amendment and its promise of racial equality in civil rights. But had the Brown
Court sought to defend segregation in a judicial opinion, the justices would have needed to
articulate a particular legal reason, a principled and doctrinally acceptable reason. It would
have been odd for Brown to have adopted one or another eccentric theory that was in fact




indeed invariably found by the judiciary when it looked closely. In light of
this experience, the Brown Court sensibly shifted the burden of proof to
segregationist governments in all future Jim Crow cases. Henceforth, gov-
ernments would need to offer compelling evidence that racial separation
was indeed equal in purpose, effect, and social meaning."
Segregationists in the 1860s also argued that racial separation would
actually serve the interests of both races and was favored by most blacks
as well as most whites. If true, then separation might indeed be "equal"
enough sociologically and therefore constitutionally-just as separate
bathrooms and separate sports teams for males and females today pass
constitutional muster precisely because a majority of each sex presumably
accepts and perhaps even prefers this separation. But whether or not
blacks in the 1860s truly preferred to sit separately in Capitol galleries or
elsewhere was largely irrelevant in the 1950s, when it was clear that Jim
Crow was an insulting and subordinating imposition by whites upon
blacks, an imposition vigorously opposed by a wide range of black leaders
and the great mass of black citizens. 12
Another segregationist argument in the 1860s was that racial segrega-
tion had a different legal form than the infamous 1860s Black Codes.
Black Codes were formally and facially asymmetric: They heaped disabil-
ities on blacks but not whites. By contrast, Jim Crow was formally sym-
metric: While blacks could not go to School X, whites were symmetrically
barred from attending School Y.
Although some 1860s segregationists thought that formal symmetry
rendered the Fourteenth Amendment textually inapplicable, they were
clearly wrong about this. To repeat, the text does not say and cannot eas-
ily be read to say that deep and abiding inequality is permissible so long
as a law is formally symmetric. Formal symmetry does not and cannot
mean the law is automatically valid. Rather, formal symmetry merely
means the law is not automatically (what lawyers call "facially") invalid,
as were the Black Codes. The simple question remains: Were formally
symmetric Jim Crow laws truly equal? It is possible to imagine some par-
allel universe where blacks as well as whites sought separation, where no
stigma attached to separation, where separation was not an instrument of
subordination. But that was not the world of Jim Crow in 1954 (or in
1896, when the Court wrongly upheld segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson).
Reconstruction-era conservatives sometimes articulated their intuition
that formal symmetry decisively distinguished segregation and anti-misce-
genation laws from Black Codes by claiming that race-separation laws
11. Pre-Brown, see generally Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950); McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Many lower-court decisions in
this era also identified fact-specific inequality.
12. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTs: THE Su-
PREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Randall Kennedy,
Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98
YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
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involved not "civil rights," but rather "social rights" that lay beyond the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. But segregation laws did not
merely allow whites to separate themselves from blacks if whites pre-
ferred this "social" arrangement. These laws required separation even if
both whites and blacks preferred to socialize together or intermarry, and
the clear purpose and meaning of such enforced separation was to deify
whites and demean blacks. Nothing in the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment signaled that this species of state action was somehow categorically
exempt from the amendment's general requirement of equal
citizenship.13
A final segregationist argument was that the Fourteenth Amendment's
equality norms applied only against state governments. While this argu-
ment, if correct, could not justify state apartheid policies, it might explain
segregation in various federal spaces such as the Capitol galleries. But the
Constitution's text plainly contradicts this argument. The amendment's
first sentence creates rights of equal citizenship that apply against the feds
as well as states. Its text provides that "[a]ll persons born . . . in the
United States" are by that fact alone "citizens of the United States"-and
thus, equal citizens at birth. This sentence in effect constitutionalized the
Declaration of Independence's "self-evident" truth-a truth that Lincoln
had famously stressed (and glossed) at Gettysburg-that all men (that is,
persons) are created (that is, born) equal. Any law, state or federal, heap-
ing disabilities or dishonor upon any citizen by dint of his or her birth
status-because he was born black, or because she was born female or
out of wedlock-violates a core principle of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's opening sentence. 14
13. Beyond the issues raised by formally symmetric laws, the civil-rights/social-rights
distinction prominent in Reconstruction-era discourse was reflected in two additional
Fourteenth Amendment ideas. First, the amendment did not apply of its own self-executing
force to certain nongovernmental activities. (Hence the so-called "state action" doctrine,
whose textual font is the opening "No State shall" language of the amendment's second
sentence.) Second, while Congress would have power under section 5 to enforce the equal-
birth-citizens idea of the amendment's opening sentence (which does not use the phrase
"No State shall") against various nongovernmental practices and institutions that might
threaten a regime of equal citizenship, there would remain real boundaries to this congres-
sional power. Congress, for example, could not under section 5 require private persons to
refrain from race discrimination in private dinner parties and dating. Such "social" prac-
tices lay outside the domain of equal citizenship, which could extend beyond the strictly
governmental (especially if Congress so provided) but which would not encompass highly
private spaces governed by individual associational/social freedom.
14. Perhaps it might be argued that in regulating its own galleries, neither house was
thereby legislating; and that each house was therefore not bound by ordinary principles
applicable to ordinary laws. But if so, segregation in the Capitol galleries loses virtually all
precedential significance for other forms of segregation backed by actual legislation. More
generally, America's implicit Constitution surely imposes many restrictions on Congress to
abide by first principles even when Congress is not strictly speaking legislating. If the First
Amendment's free-speech principles apply to presidents and courts who seek to censor-
notwithstanding the amendment's limited textual command that "Congress shall make no
law"-then surely these principles also constrain Congress even when Congress is not leg-
islating but, say, regulating its galleries via the internal rules of each house. And what is
true of free-speech principles is likewise true of equal-citizenship principles.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1866-a companion statute passed by the same
Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the same season
and by nearly the same vote-featured language virtually identical to this
sentence, and explicitly linked this language to a racial-equality rule bind-
ing both state and federal officialdom:
All persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color.. . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to . . . full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties,
and to none other.15
Beyond the Fourteenth Amendment, the anti-nobility clauses of the
Founders' Constitution explicitly applied against both state and federal
officials, as did the Fifteenth Amendment, which demanded racial equal-
ity not just in Election Day voting but also in other voting venues such as
jury rooms and legislative assemblies.16
And speaking of legislative assemblies, we should pay close attention,
as did Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner in pointed and poignant
remarks delivered shortly after the Fifteenth Amendment's ratification,
to the fact that the Reconstruction Congress itself allowed its black and
white members to sit side by side on a plane of perfect equality-indeed,
as "brother[s]"-on the House and Senate floor. 7 "[W]e have had in this
Chamber a colored Senator from Mississippi; but according to [segrega-
tionist ideology] we should have set him apart by himself; he should not
have sat with his brother Senators . . . . [A colored man] is equal here in
this Chamber. I say he should be equal in rights everywhere."18
In embracing Sumner's brotherly vision many decades later, the Brown
Court not only obeyed the plain meaning of the Constitution's text, but
15. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added). Congress enacted
this statute to implement the Thirteenth Amendment's anti-slavery and anti-caste princi-
ples, and to overrule the Dred Scott case, which had claimed that free blacks were not
citizens. Democrat critics claimed that the statute went beyond Congress's powers under
the Thirteenth Amendment. Ending slavery, they argued, did not entail citizenship for all
and race-neutral civil rights, as provided for in this act. Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill,
and Congress overrode him by a two-thirds vote of each house-the first major override in
American history. Once it became clear that Reconstruction Republicans could muster a
two-thirds vote on a matter of supreme consequence, reformers proceeded to propose the
Fourteenth Amendment, in part to provide an unquestionable constitutional foundation
for the still-contested Civil Rights Act. The act has always been understood by lawyers and
judges as intimately linked to the amendment. Indeed, the act can even be seen as part of
the amendment's very enactment process.
16. On the Fifteenth Amendment, see ACAB, supra note 4, at 400-01, 612-13 n.106;
AKHIL REED AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 273-74 (1998);
see generally AMAR, supra note 3. Consider also the equality component of the Fifth
Amendment's due-process clause, as glossed by the Fourteenth Amendment's equal-pro-
tection and due-process clauses, see BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,
supra at 281-83; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 763-73 (1999).
Cf. supra note 3.
17. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 2d Sess., 242 (1871).
18. Id.
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also carried forward the Reconstruction practice that best embodied the
promise of the text: the integration of the floor of Congress itself.
IV. LOVING
Brown and Bolling thus correctly understood and honored the docu-
ment's core meaning. Equal meant equal, and citizenship meant citizen-
ship. On May 17, 1954, the Court read the Constitution aright and said
what the law was. As cases about constitutional interpretation-about the
meaning of the written Constitution, and about the judiciary's province
and duty of law declaration-Brown and Bolling were easy as pie.
The Brown opinion also famously said that, at least in the field of edu-
cation, separate was "inherently unequal." Inherently? If understood as a
claim about the meaning of the Constitution, this sentence might seem
confused. Separate does not mean "unequal" in any obvious dictionary
sense. Nor did the Reconstruction Republicans believe that separate was
always and everywhere unequal as a matter of logic.
But if Brown's famous sentence is understood as an effort to implement
rather than simply interpret the Constitution, the sentence makes perfect
sense. In order to make the equality rule-the Constitution's true mean-
ing-effective in courtrooms and in the world beyond courtrooms, the
Supreme Court had to fashion implementing sub-rules to guide lawyers,
lower courts (both state and federal), school administrators, state legisla-
tors, and so on. One possible implementing sub-rule could have simply
required black plaintiffs in each and every case to prove that separate was
unequal on the facts at hand. But given that separate was almost always
unequal in the real world of 1954, would this litigation burden have been
fair? After all, this sub-rule would have imposed serious and not-fully-
compensable litigation costs and time delays on those who, at the end of
the day, were highly likely to prevail in court based on the actual history
and practice of Jim Crow. This sub-rule would also have perversely en-
couraged state officials to continue to sham and wink and frustrate the
real meaning of the Constitution. And would such a sub-rule have given
strong guidance and cover to lower courts-especially state courts oper-
ating under pressure from segregationist state lawmakers?
The written Constitution's terse text did not-and could not realisti-
cally be expected to-answer all these second-order issues about how to
implement the equality norm in the particular milieu of mid-twentieth
century Jim Crow. The written Constitution simply laid down the civil
equality principle and entrusted courts (among others) with the task of
making that principle real in court and on the ground, as genuine law of
the land. The rule announced on May 17, 1954-that de jure segregation
would be presumed unequal in light of the actual history of Jim Crow-
was a thoroughly proper way for the Court to discharge its duty of consti-
tutional implementation.
Why, we might wonder, did Brown limit its ruling to the field of educa-
tion? As a matter of constitutional meaning, the Court was right to note
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that the Fourteenth Amendment equality mandate applied only over a
limited domain. (For example, the words and the original public meaning
of section 1 of the amendment did not apply to political rights such as
voting or jury service.) But nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment's idea
of equal citizenship distinguished between a racial caste system in public
schools on the one hand and a racial caste system in public beaches or
public transportation on the other.
The Brown Court nevertheless dealt only with education:
Plessy v. Ferguson involv[ed] not education but transportation ....
[In 1950] the Court expressly reserved decision on the question
whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public ed-
ucation. In the instant cases, that question is directly presented ....
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'sep-
arate but equal' has no place. 19
One case at a time is an appropriate way for "judicial power" to oper-
ate. It would also have been permissible for the Brown Court to have
fashioned a more sweeping opinion that made clear that the Court's core
idea-that Jim Crow was simply not equal-of course applied outside
education as well. Alongside the cautious sensibility that judges may and
often should simply decide one case at a time, there exists a background
first principle-a principle that went without saying for the Founders and/
or was implicit in the words "judicial power"-that judges must decide
like cases alike. If a caste system in transportation was really no different
than a caste system in education, then the same constitutional rule that
applied in one domain applied as well in the other.
Having opened the door in Brown to the possibility that education
might be unlike transportation, the Warren Court correctly closed that
door in a 1956 case involving Alabama buses, Gayle v. Browder. But the
Gayle Court acted in a two-sentence ruling that offered no real explana-
tion. The first sentence simply announced the result ending bus segrega-
tion, and the second sentence merely cited Brown and two post-Brown
cases (neither of which involved transportation). This was problematic.
Judicial doctrine and judicial power require judges to offer carefully rea-
soned explanations for their rulings. Having opted to write a 1954 Brown
opinion that did not simply say "equality, equality, equality" but that
seemed to qualify the scope of the Court's holding by also saying "educa-
tion, education, education," the Warren Court over the next several years
failed in its declaratory and implementational tasks of making crystal
clear to lawyers, lower courts, school administrators, state legislators, and
the rest of the citizenry what the legally operative principles truly were
and why.20
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491-95 (1954) (citations omitted; emphasis
altered).
20. See also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(discussing beaches); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (discussing golf
courses).
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Two factors, one backward-looking and one forward-looking, explain
this lapse. First, had the Court in 1954 simply said "equality, equality,
equality" in all realms of public citizenship (political rights excepted), the
justices would have had to make clear that the Court had been wrong
from day one in Plessy. In addition to striking down a mass of state law,
the Court would have had to openly overturn its own high-profile prece-
dent. Yet the Court has at times been loath to admit its own past errors.
Although most people today remember Brown as having formally over-
turned Plessy, in fact the Court did no such thing in May 1954, and the
overruling of Plessy became evident only in retrospect (in the cryptic
Gayle case).
Second, the Brown justices knew that massive remedial and imple-
mentational challenges lay ahead in making the Court's ruling and the
underlying constitutional equality principle truly the law of the land on
the ground. Had the Court in 1954 simply said "equality, equality, equal-
ity" it would have been clear that all state laws prohibiting interracial
marriage were also unconstitutional. 21 This is indeed what the Constitu-
tion, properly read, means. Equal means equal, and legally imposed racial
separation in this domain was not truly equal. In the 1967 case of Loving
v. Virginia, the Court said just that, in an opinion authored by Warren
himself.
But when Warren said this in June 1967-at the dawn of the now-fa-
mous "summer of love"-bans on interracial marriages were relatively
rare among states and were even more rarely enforced with vigor and
efficacy. By 1967, Congress and President Johnson had jumped into the
fray in full support of Brown's vision, via landmark civil rights and voting
rights laws, and via the appointment of pro-Brown judges such as
Thurgood Marshall and Irving L. Goldberg. By 1967, blacks who had long
been disfranchised in massive numbers in some parts of the South were
finally being allowed to vote and could count on fair apportionment rules
after the next census. By 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr. had delivered his
iconic speech celebrating an interracial dream of whites and blacks join-
ing hands, and America had indeed witnessed and celebrated the interra-
cial joining of hands that was visible at the Lincoln Memorial at the very
moment King spoke these words.
In 1954, however, resistance to interracial dating was far more intense,
widespread, and politically powerful. Indeed, this resistance underlay
much of Jim Crow in education: many white parents did not want their
fair-skinned girls to go to integrated schools where they might socialize
(and perhaps become romantically involved) with dark-skinned boys.
Had Earl Warren written Brown in a manner that clearly entailed the
invalidity of miscegenation laws, he would have thereby made the task of
21. But cf. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S.
891 (1955), aff'd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1955), motion to recall, mandate denied, and appeal
dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (a case in which the Court ducked the miscegenation issue
in the immediate aftermath of Brown).
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ensuring actual compliance with Brown all the harder in the difficult days
ahead. If the judicial province and duty is not merely to say what the law
is, but also to make the law real, then Brown's narrowness becomes eas-
ier to justify.
V. LEGACY
Nearly half a century after Earl Warren's departure from the bench,
the justices continue to operate on a field of constitutional argumentation
mapped by the Warren Court. So do other branches of government, state
and federal; so does the legal professoriate; and so does the public at
large. Thus, lawyers, judges, politicians, and pundits of all stripes-liberal
and conservative, originalists and living constitutionalists-now take for
granted the basic teachings of the Warren Court and argue within the
Warren framework.
For example, no one today challenges the rightness of Brown. Rather,
Americans now wrangle over Brown's meaning, with both liberals and
conservatives wrapping themselves in its mantle. Liberals invoke Brown
for its affirmation of substantive equality, its vision of integration and
inclusion, and its recognition of the supreme importance of public educa-
tion as a gateway to equal citizenship. Conservatives deploy Brown and
its companion Bolling to underscore the general evil of racial classifica-
tions, even when such classifications are claimed to benefit blacks and/or
promote integration, and even when Congress itself has endorsed these
race-conscious regimes.22
Perhaps some justices today may (erroneously) harbor private doubts
about the rightness of the Warren Court's incorporation doctrine-that
Court's insistence that, thanks to the Fourteenth Amendment, virtually
all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights properly apply to (in legal
jargon, are "incorporated" against) state and local officials. Yet none of
the justices in the last three decades has ever called this basic doctrine
into question, even in passing. Every term the Court's docket teems with
post-incorporation cases, with the justices routinely using the Bill of
Rights to keep states in line-sometimes to achieve liberal results (for
example, by striking down unusually troubling death-penalty sentences
and laws improperly favoring religion), other times for more conservative
ends (for instance, by invalidating ultra-strict gun-control ordinances and
confiscatory environmental regulations). 23
22. Compare the contrasting visions of Brown on pervasive display in Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705, 742-43, 747-48,
773-79, 788, 798-99, 303-04, 864, 866-68 (2007), in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas offered politically conservative readings of Brown, Justices Breyer and Stevens
offered politically liberal readings, and Justice Kennedy's swing opinion split the
difference.
23. While Justice Thomas has raised questions about the incorporation of the estab-
lishment clause in particular-see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1, 49-54 (2004) abrogated by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377 (U.S. 2014) (Thomas, J., concurring)-he has elsewhere vigorously applied and,
in the context of the Second Amendment, extended the basic principles of incorporation.
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Freedom of speech has never had so many friends on the Court as at
present, but conservatives and liberals have different ideas about the
deep meaning of Warren Court landmarks such as New York Times v.
Sullivan. Liberals have deployed Sullivan to explain why Congress should
not be able to insulate itself from criticism spearheaded by the Legal Ser-
vice Corporation, while conservatives have invoked the case to explain
why Congress should likewise be barred from regulating campaign fi-
nance in incumbent-protective and speech-limiting ways. 2 4 So, too, cur-
rent church-state law operates within the boundaries laid down by
landmarks such as Engel v. Vitale and Abington v. Schempp. It is hard to
imagine that the Court in the foreseeable future would countenance a
return to state-sponsored recitational prayer in the classroom.
Voting-rights case law follows the same pattern. All justices accept the
basic teachings of Harper v. Virginia, Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict, Baker v. Carr, and Reynolds v. Sims, even as conservatives and liber-
als joust over the meaning and proper application of these Warren Court
classics. Exhibit A is the Court's 2000 decision in Bush v. Gore. In that
case, a bare Court majority explicitly invoked Harper and Reynolds to
end an uneven recount then underway. Dissenters claimed Warren's leg-
acy for themselves, arguing that the recount was actually working to miti-
gate Election Day inequalities that had disproportionately disfranchised
poor and minority voters.25
The Justices are not the only ones who have enthusiastically embraced
Warren-style voting rights. Every state legislature today abides by one-
person, one-vote; so does the House of Representatives; and the
franchise extends to nearly all adult citizens. Virtually no one-neither
major political party, no important political leader, no mass popular
movement, no notable school of academic thought, no respected group of
public intellectuals or opinion leaders, no venerable think tank-forth-
rightly proposes a return to the old days of disfranchisement and malap-
portionment. (Crafty politicos today do attempt to cheat-and frankly,
Texas politicos are some of the worst offenders-but .these pols loudly
deny that their true purpose is to disfranchise eligible voters and/or to
count votes unequally.) Moving outside of government circles, ordinary
Americans today broadly claim the rights to vote and to vote equally,
believe that these rights are theirs, and embody these beliefs in routine
practices that are nearly universally celebrated. These rights have thus
become Ninth Amendment rights retained by the people and elements of
See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059-60 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
24. The leading opinion on each topic-Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 548-49 (2001), and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310,
339-41 (2010)-was authored by the Court's current swing Justice, Anthony Kennedy.
When Kennedy was a youth in Sacramento, California, then-Governor Earl Warren was a
frequent guest at the Kennedy home.
25. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam) (citing Harper and




proper republican government-even if they were not so when the Re-
publican-Government Clause and the Ninth Amendment were written. 26
The only major post-Warren retrenchment involves the exclusionary
rule, which continues to limp along, but with substantial restrictions and
amidst considerable anti-exclusion rhetoric on the Court, paralleling
broader skepticism in the American populace about the rule's basic
premises.27
Today's world of judicial doctrine and general constitutional discourse
is thus the world of Earl Warren, Hugo Black, and William Brennan.
Their legacy endures. 28
VII. LESSONS
What lessons should we draw from the Warren Court cases, and from
the post-Warren Court's response to this body of case law, about the
proper relationship between the document and the doctrine?
Recall the basic lines of critique aimed at Warren and his brethren.
First, critics claimed that Warren Court doctrine mangled the document.
But as we have seen, the landmark cases generally got it right.
Alas, the Warren Court often reached the right result while saying odd
things that confounded serious textualists and honest historians. Did
''process" really mean substance? Was the key clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment's opening section, affirming the privileges and immunities of
citizens, irrelevant? What about the "sleeping giant" Republican-Govern-
26. While popular understandings do not generally suffice to subtract from expressly
enumerated or structurally implicit constitutional rules and rights, the beliefs of the Ameri-
can people over time are especially relevant in glossing open-ended clauses, especially
those that explicitly reference "the people," as the Ninth does in so many words and as the
Republican-Government Clause does via the cognate word "republican," which both ety-
mologically and conceptually revolves around the principle of popular/populist/public/peo-
ple-based government. (For more details on these etymological and conceptual
connections, see ACAB, supra note 4, at 276-81.)
27. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) (proclaiming that the
only truly principled basis for the exclusionary rule-involving a fusion of the Fourth
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause-had "not stood the test
of time"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 486, 493 (1976) (holding the exclusionary
rule inapplicable in federal habeas corpus cases reviewing state court convictions); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to civil
cases); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (creating an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule in order to impeach a criminal defendant's testimony); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984) (echoing Fisher verbatim and carving out an exception to the
exclusionary rule for certain violations of the Fourth Amendment involving "good faith"
behavior of police officers); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 599, 616 (2006) (apply-
ing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Her-
ring, 555 U.S. 135, 138-39 (2009) (broadly reading the Leon good-faith exception
doctrine).
28. Most commentators agree that the key constitutional contributions of the Warren
Court occurred in the following six fields: race, incorporation, speech, religion, criminal
procedure, and voting rights. While two other fields in today's constitutional discourse-
privacy law and sex-equality law-have more obvious origins in the 1970s Burger Court, as
reflected in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973), some see the 1965 Warren Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), as the forerunner of these later cases.
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ment Clause that had made Reconstruction possible? Did the rights of
"persons," as sharply distinguished from those of "citizens," really en-
compass voting? (Was the Fifteenth Amendment thus unnecessary? The
Nineteenth as well?) If equal protection principles applied against the
federal government (A la Bolling), and if these principles required equally
populous districts even for state senates (as required by Reynolds v.
Sims), then why wasn't the United States Senate itself unconstitutional?
(If the Court could one day say that most states had unconstitutional gov-
ernments that required major restructuring after the next census, what
would stop the Court from saying the same thing the next day about the
Senate?) In the face of these questions, the Warren Court failed to ex-
plain itself satisfactorily.
The Court's case law was also a moving target, making it harder for
contemporaries to understand the Court's real principles. Thus, Brown
said not that the pro-Jim-Crow precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson was over-
ruled, but only that Plessy did not apply in the domain of education. But
then the Court promptly issued a series of one-paragraph decisions with
absolutely no explanation, applying Brown beyond education to public
beaches and to golf courses, and even to state-segregated buses-that is,
to transportation, the very domain that had given rise to Plessy (a rail-
road segregation case). Similarly, in Baker v. Carr, the Court floated one
standard for voting, but then in Reynolds v. Sims, the justices followed a
very different standard-one that had been expressly disavowed by a
couple of the concurring opinions in Baker.
Consider next another major charge against the Court-that it bristled
with activists disrespectful of Congress. Here are the numbers: in War-
ren's sixteen years as Chief, the Court invalidated acts of Congress in
twenty-three cases-about the same clip that had prevailed in several ear-
lier periods, and a somewhat lower rate than in the ensuing Burger-Rehn-
quist Court, which slapped down Congress sixty-nine times in thirty-six
years. Notably, the Warren Court never struck down a federal civil rights
or voting rights act of Congress, as had early Courts and as would later
Courts.29
In fact, the Warren Court generally partnered with Congress, especially
in the area of civil rights and voting rights. True, the Court did strike
down a federal policy of segregation in Bolling, but that policy was the
29. From 1865 through 1888, the Court struck down acts of Congress in sixteen cases
(one of which-one of the Legal Tender Cases-was later overruled within this window);
from 1899 through 1912, the Court invalidated congressional action in fourteen cases; from
1920 through 1936, the Court tossed out Congress's handiwork in over thirty cases. The
data here derive from compilations in LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COM-
PENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT 776-80 tbl. 2-15 (4th ed. 2007). There is
some imprecision in these numbers. Nice classification questions arise when a very small
part of a large statute is judicially disregarded, and also when a statute is not held to be to
be "facially" unconstitutional in all applications but is rather found to be unconstitutional
only as applied to certain facts. Moreover, judicial review resulting in the "invalidation" of
a statute exists on a continuum with judicial techniques "avoiding" invalidation by constru-
ing a statute in an exceedingly narrow-and perhaps textually implausible-way.
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ghost of Congress past. Most Congress members in 1954 were probably
opposed to federal segregation, but reformers could not overcome the
intense opposition of a pro-segregation minority that enjoyed considera-
ble congressional seniority and deployed the filibuster aggressively. Even-
tually, this congressional minority was overcome in the mid-1960s, and it
was precisely Congress's landmark legislation under President Lyndon
Johnson's leadership that burnished Brown's reputation and increased
compliance with Brown's mandate.30
Critics also err in suggesting that the Warren Court generally defied
public opinion. Had the Court done so consistently, its legacy would
likely not have lasted. In the long run, old justices leave; new ones arrive;
the new ones are picked by presidents (with senatorial oversight); and the
people pick presidents (and senators). In fact, many of the Warren cases
and ideals are widely celebrated in today's popular culture-Brown, of
course; the free-speech principles of New York Times v. Sullivan; the in-
nocence-protecting vision of Gideon v. Wainwright; and the basic Harper-
Reynolds notion that everyone should vote and have his vote counted
equally. Most citizens would recoil against any proposal that states should
be free to violate the Bill of Rights.
The big exceptions to this general pattern are the exclusionary rule and
closely related Warren Court doctrines that freed criminals on what crit-
ics called "legal technicalities"-that is, on grounds unrelated to actual
innocence or innocence-protecting procedures, such as Gideon v. Wain-
wright's right of counsel.
The general fidelity of the Warren Court to the deepest ideals of the
written Constitution came at the expense of fidelity to precedent. As one
tart critic put it, "[T]he list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court
reads like a table of contents from an old constitutional law casebook." 31
Under Warren, the Court overruled itself in some forty-five cases-
more than half as many times as in the entire history of pre-Warren
America. Since Warren, the Court has continued this brisk pace of over-
30. See generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTs REVOLU-
TION (2014).
31. Philip B. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 90-91 (1970).
While the work of Professor David Strauss is far more celebratory of the Warren Court,
Strauss has not successfully explained how that Court's reversal of precedents across the
board- race, incorporation, speech, religion, criminal procedure, and voting rights-
squares with his own advocacy of "common law constitutionalism." See David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 894-95 (1996). For a
valiant effort to provide such an explanation-an effort that, alas, fails to discuss huge
portions of the Warren Court revolution and that nowhere confronts the breathtaking
sweep of the revolution as a whole-see David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of
the Warren Court, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 845 (2007). Strauss claims that "the Warren
Court's most important decisions cannot be easily justified on the basis of the text of the
Constitution or the original understandings" and that "If you look only to those sources of
law, you will not find justification for what the Warren Court did." Id. at 845, 850. In
today's lecture and elsewhere, I have attempted to defend the Warren Court against pre-
cisely these sorts of claims. The only major Warren-era decisions that I have declined to
defend, today and in other venues, are exclusionary-rule rulings such as Mapp-a quadrant
of case law unmentioned by Strauss.
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ruling. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court overturned its own
precedents in over sixty cases. Here, too, the Warren Court established
the basic judicial model that still applies.32
If the Warren Court was essentially right in its constitutional vision,
and if earlier Courts that had rejected that vision were wrong-if, for
example, Plessy stank and Brown soared; if incorporation was constitu-
tionally correct, whereas earlier cases erred in refusing to protect Ameri-
cans from state abuses; if Warren and company were right to embrace
federal civil rights and voting rights laws that earlier justices had improp-
erly condemned or ignored; if Gideon v. Wainwright deserves to be glori-
fied for overturning an earlier decision that was impoverished even at the
moment it was handed down-then what does this say about the Court
itself over time?33
Just this: For much of its history after John Marshall and before Earl
Warren, the Court dishonored both the American Constitution's terse
text and the American people, who enacted and who continue to em-
brace that text. The Warren Court's friends who urged the justices to quit
worrying about the written Constitution got it backwards. Reflecting the
deep wisdom of the American people in their most decisive moments, the
written Constitution deserves judicial fidelity because it is the law, and
because, for all its flaws, it has usually been juster than the justices. In the
century and a half since the Civil War, the Court whose grand themes
most closely tracked the letter and spirit of that text-the Warren
Court-is the Court that has quite rightly enjoyed the most enduring in-
fluence over both its judicial successors and American society more
generally.
32. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
2245-89 (1996), (Johnny H. Killian & George A Costello eds. 2014) (appendix prepared by
Congressional Research Service compiling "Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Sub-
sequent Decisions") (listing eighty-eight cases overruling precedents pre-Warren; forty-five
cases from the Warren years; and sixty-one cases in the 1970s and 1980s). As with the data
presented in supra note 26 and accompanying text, the figures here are the products of the
compilers' interpretive judgments. For example, at what point are we to say that a given
disfavored case has been in effect overruled sub silentio-rejected by the Court even
though not expressly overruled? When certain language in case 1 is cast aside in later case
2, does it matter whether that discarded language is the "holding" of case or merely
"dicta"? If so, how is the line to be drawn between "holding" and "dicta"?
33. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruled by Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overrul-
ing, Sup. CT. REV. 211 (1963).
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